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Abstract 
We study the impact of too big to fail (TBTF) guarantees on bank competition for retail deposits. 
Exploiting information about all personal deposit accounts in Denmark and salient changes to the deposit 
insurance limit, we provide evidence that systemically important banks successfully retain and attract 
uninsured deposits in a crisis at the expense of other banks even as they differentially lower their interest 
rates. The funding shock suffered by non-systemic banks causes a decrease in their lending. The results 
point to distortive effects of TBTF guarantees in the market for retail deposits. 
  
                                                          
* Rajkamal Iyer: Imperial College, South Kensington campus, London, SW72AZ. E-mail: riyer@ic.ac.uk. Thais Jensen: 
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, DK-1353 Copenhagen K and Danmarks 
Nationalbank, Havnegade 5, DK-1093 Copenhagen K. E-mail: tlj@econ.ku.dk. Niels Johannesen: Department of Economics, 
University of Copenhagen and CEBI, Øster Farimagsgade 5, DK-1353 Copenhagen K. E-mail: niels.johannesen@econ.ku.dk. 
Adam Sheridan: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen and CEBI, Øster Farimagsgade 5, DK-1353. Email: 
adam.sheridan@econ.ku.dk. We thank Puriya Abbassi, Nittai Bergman, Doug Diamond, Antoinette Schoar, Andrei Shleifer, 
Jeremy Stein and Phil Strahan, Haluk Unal and seminar participants at University of Maryland, Wharton, HEC Paris, 
University of Zurich, University of Oxford, NUS, Imperial College, UCLA, Federal Reserve Board and FDIC for comments. 
The paper has previously been circulated under the title “The Run for Safety: Financial Fragility and Deposit Insurance”. The 
activities of the Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI) are financed by a grant from the Danish National 
Research Foundation. 
 2 
1. Introduction 
Most governments explicitly guarantee the safety of bank deposits through deposit insurance schemes. 
Governments also make implicit guarantees that, unlike deposit insurance, are not enshrined in law to 
apply equally to all banks. By nature of being implicit governments often refer to such guarantees 
somewhat tangentially, calling the recipient banks “systemically important”. In popular opinion, and on 
occasion confirmed as such by governments themselves, these guarantees reflect the fact that certain 
banks benefit from special government protection because they are too big to fail (TBTF).  
An important concern about TBTF guarantees is that they may distort competition for deposits. When 
explicit deposit insurance is unlimited, TBTF guarantees should not matter for depositor choices: all 
deposits are safe, both in banks that are systemically important and in banks that are not. However, when 
deposit insurance is limited, TBTF guarantees may be distortive: deposit balances above the limit are 
generally at risk, but less so for deposits at systemic banks that are more likely to be bailed out in the 
event of distress. Arguably, the distortive effect is particularly pronounced in times of crisis when 
depositors fear for the safety of their savings.  
The concern that TBTF guarantees may be distortive emerged clearly in the debate about the Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program, a blanket guarantee on non-interest bearing transaction accounts issued by 
the U.S. government at the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. When the blanket guarantee was due to 
expire in 2012, “bankers at nearly all but the largest financial institutions […] pleaded with Congress to 
extend the program” (New York Times, 2012; emphasis our own). Invoking the competitive advantage 
conferred on large banks by TBTF guarantees, small banks expressed concerns that they would lose 
deposits if the blanket guarantee were to be removed. 
In this paper, we investigate the distortions caused by TBTF guarantees by exploiting salient changes to 
deposit insurance in Denmark for empirical identification. To mitigate the effects of the global credit 
crunch, the Danish government chose to guarantee all bank liabilities in 2008. However, following a 
decision by the European Union to harmonize deposit insurance across its member states, insurance was 
limited at DKK 750,000 in 2010. The limit left around 20% of all retail deposits uninsured in a period 
with frequent bank failures. This course of events provides a useful laboratory for measuring the 
distortive effects of TBTF guarantees in the market for retail deposits. Intuitively, we can compare the 
distribution of deposits in the period with unlimited deposit insurance (2008-2009), where TBTF 
guarantees should have no effect on depositor choices, and the period with limited deposit insurance 
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(2010-2011), where TBTF guarantees may have affected the allocation of deposits above the insurance 
limit.  
For the purposes of this analysis, we have access to a unique dataset with annual end-of-year balances 
for every bank account in Danish banks held by individuals during the period 2003-2011. To this dataset, 
we add detailed information about banks and account holders. We thus observe the total deposits held 
by each individual in the Danish banking system; how individuals allocate deposits across banks; how 
this allocation changes in response to the insurance limit; and how the magnitude of the responses 
depends on bank and depositor characteristics.  
In the first step of the empirical analysis, we document that the deposit insurance limit induced significant 
depositor responses: individuals with deposits above the limit split their deposits across multiple accounts 
to remain fully insured, but did not withdraw deposits from the banking system.  
We derive these results in various ways. First, we plot the distribution of deposit balances and document 
that significant bunching emerges at DKK 750,000 in 2010 in the account-level distribution, but not in 
the individual-level distribution. This is suggestive that depositors drew down account balances to the 
insurance limit (account-level bunching) while placing the excess balances on accounts in other banks 
(no individual-level bunching). Second, aggregating deposits in the same range and the same bank, we 
employ a regression framework. We show that account-level deposit balances above and below DKK 
750,000 diverged sharply in 2010 with balances above the limit decreasing by around 50% relative to 
balances below. However, individual-level deposit balances above and below the limit followed the same 
trend throughout the estimation period. This confirms that depositors reallocated account balances above 
the insurance limit but did not withdraw funds from the banking system. Third, we study depositors’ 
propensity to increase the number of accounts directly and document a sharp increase in splitting of 
deposit accounts in 2010, but only for individuals with deposits above DKK 750,000. 
In the main analysis, we build on these results to show that the reallocation of deposits across accounts 
involved a systematic reallocation of deposits across banks: the six largest and systemically important 
banks were much more successful at retaining and attracting deposits above the insurance limit even as 
they differentially reduced interest rates on uninsured deposits. These results suggest that TBTF 
guarantees distort the market for retail deposits by reducing the perceived risk of holding uninsured 
deposits in systemic banks. 
The finding that deposit quantities changed differentially in systemic and non-systemic banks emerges from 
analysis of the distribution of deposit balances across banks and a regression framework, mirroring our 
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approaches in the first stage of the analysis. In the account-level distribution of deposit balances, we find 
pronounced bunching at DKK 750,000 for non-systemic banks, but almost none for systemic banks. In 
a regression framework, we show that deposits above the insurance limit decreased by around 50% 
relative to deposits below in non-systemic banks, but only by around 20% in systemic banks. These 
results do not reflect a perception among depositors that larger banks are safer because of superior risk-
management technologies or otherwise: the loss of uninsured deposits is increasing in bank size through 
the distribution, except at the very top where the six systemic banks suffered exceptionally small losses. 
Moreover, the results are unlikely to be confounded by factors correlating with systemic importance: the 
difference between systemic and non-systemic banks remains virtually unchanged when we 
simultaneously allow deposit losses to be heterogeneous in other bank characteristics (liquidity, 
capitalization and profitability) and average customer characteristics (gender, age and income). 
Complementing the results on deposit quantities, we also show that deposit prices changed differentially in 
systemic and non-systemic banks when deposit insurance was limited: the interest rates on very large 
deposits was almost identical throughout the period 2006-2009 but then diverged in 2010, with systemic 
banks lowering their rates by around 0.4 percentage points relative to non-systemic banks. By contrast, 
interest rates on accounts below the insurance limit followed the same trend throughout the estimation 
period. The results imply that the differential shock to the supply of deposits above DKK 750,000 was 
even larger than suggested by the observed movements in deposit quantities: if systemic and non-systemic 
banks had continued to apply the same deposit prices, the divergence in deposit quantities would arguably 
have been even larger.  
Losses of deposits may have repercussions in the real economy, as suggested by recent evidence that 
funding shocks to banks are transmitted to firms and households though credit supply (Chodorow-Reich, 
2014; Jensen and Johannesen, 2017). In the last part of the analysis, we show that the reallocation of 
uninsured deposits towards TBTF banks affected lending. For identification, we exploit cross-sectional 
variation in exposure to the funding shock coming from differences in deposits above the insurance limit. 
We first show that a larger share of deposits above DKK 750,000 in 2007 was associated with less new 
lending over the period 2007-2011 but only for non-systemic banks. In an instrumental variables 
framework, we find that a 1% decrease in deposits in non-systemic banks, induced by the deposit 
reallocation, reduced their lending by 0.35%. This finding suggests that the funding shocks induced by 
the cut to the insurance limit were partly transmitted to the real economy through a contraction of bank 
lending.  
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This paper contributes to the literature on banks that are too-big-to-fail (Flannery, 2010; Strahan, 2013). 
Existing papers have examined equity market reactions to the announcement of TBTF guarantees 
(O’Hara and Shaw, 1990) and compared the sensitivity of bond yields to bank risk across periods where 
TBTF guarantees varied in strength (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996). While other related papers on the most 
recent crisis have shown that general government guarantees stimulated overall deposit growth in the 
banking sector (Acharya and Mora, 2015), our paper is the first to document the competitive distortions 
created by asymmetric guarantees in deposit markets. 
Our results also contribute to the broader literature on how government interventions in the banking 
sector shape outcomes such as financial stability and competition. Cross-country studies find that explicit 
deposit insurance increases the likelihood of financial crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008) while other types of interventions, such as liquidity support, 
recapitalizations, and nationalizations, have been shown to increase competition (Calderon and Schaeck, 
2016). The former result finds support in recent bank-level evidence that increases in deposit insurance 
induce banks to become more risky (Lambert, Noth, and Schüwer, 2017) while the latter result is 
consistent with the finding that higher perceived bailout probabilities increase the risk-taking of 
competitor banks  (Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel, 2011). Our analysis contributes to this literature by 
showing that TBTF guarantees may destabilize the financial sector by tilting deposit market competition 
in favor of systemic banks and thus causing material funding shocks to non-systemic banks.  
Our findings point to an important interplay between deposit insurance and TBTF guarantees, with 
implications for policy design. The key result is that depositors reallocate uninsured balances from non-
systemic banks to systemic banks when they perceive a high risk of bank failures. If the insurance limit 
is high, only a fraction of deposits are uninsured and the scope for reallocation is limited. Conversely, if 
the insurance limit is low, large reallocations are possible and these movements could cause a severe 
funding shock to non-systemic banks. While TBTF guarantees add to the fragility of non-systemic banks, 
policymakers can mitigate this by raising the deposit insurance limit in times of crisis. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional environment. Section 3 
describes the data. Sections 4-6 present the results. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Background 
2.1 The financial crisis in Denmark 
In the years prior to the global financial crisis in 2007-2008, Danish banks expanded their lending 
substantially in response to strong domestic credit demand and a booming housing market. Credit growth 
far outpaced growth in deposits and, therefore, Danish banks increasingly relied on financing from 
foreign financial institutions, often in the form of short-term loans and bonds. Leverage ratios were thus 
soaring and liquidity ratios plummeting, but with abundant liquidity in international money markets 
profitability was generally high and no Danish banks failed during the boom leading up to financial crisis 
(Rangvid et al., 2013). 
While Danish banks had very limited direct exposure to the U.S. mortgage-backed securities that were 
the immediate cause of the financial crisis, many of them were adversely affected by the tightening of 
credit in 2007-2008 (Shin, 2009; Jensen and Johannesen, 2017). At the same time, the Danish housing 
market was deteriorating and several banks with large exposure to real estate developers failed. The most 
prominent of these failures were Bank Trelleborg in March 2008 and Roskilde Bank in August 2008.  
When Lehman Brothers failed in September 2008 and international credit markets froze, the funding 
situation of many Danish banks became critical and a law was swiftly adopted that temporarily extended 
an unlimited government guarantee to all bank liabilities. Only a handful of very minor banks chose not 
to participate in the program, which became effective on 10 October 2008 and was set to expire on 30 
September 2010.  
While many governments resorted to outright nationalizations of the most troubled banks (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2013), the Danish government intervened somewhat more lightly when banks were in distress. 
In October 2008, the government established a company, “Finansiel Stabilitet”, serving to take over the 
assets and liabilities of failing banks with the aim of a quick resale or liquidation. A few months later, in 
January 2009, the government offered capital to banks in the form of hybrid core capital, paying a risk 
premium of 6 percent over the policy rate and being convertible into share capital in the event of distress. 
2.2 Government guarantees 
In Denmark, similar to the U.S., deposit insurance coverage is determined separately for accounts held 
by the same individual at different banks, that is, the deposit insurance limit applies on a per-depositor, 
per-bank basis. This allows depositors to increase effective coverage by holding accounts at multiple 
banks.  
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Prior to the financial crisis, bank deposits up to DKK 300,000 were covered by deposit insurance. In 
October 2008, at roughly the same time as the Danish government extended a temporary guarantee to 
all bank liabilities, the European Commission proposed to harmonize the level of protection of the 
ordinary deposit insurance schemes across the EU member states. The European Commission proposal 
responded to concerns that differing levels of deposit insurance could lead to flight of deposits across 
borders and threaten the stability of the banking system in countries with relatively low insurance limits. 
Thus, compliance with the proposal required that Denmark reduce its coverage to a threshold set by the 
European Commission. A Danish law, adopted in spring 2009, implemented the new European rules by 
setting the deposit insurance limit to EUR 100,000, approximately DKK 750,000 at the pegged exchange 
rate, as of 1 October 2010. Note that the European Union determined the threshold and set it to be 
uniform across all member states; hence, it was exogenous to the Danish banking system and left a 
substantial portion of deposits in Danish banks uninsured, as discussed below.  
On introduction of the DKK 750,000 deposit insurance limit in October 2010, the Danish banking sector 
was still in crisis. During the period 2008-2010, a total of 30 small and medium-sized Danish banks were 
taken over by “Finansiel Stabilitet” or absorbed by competing banks after failing to meet the capital 
requirements of the regulatory authority, and even more banks went out of business voluntarily (Rangvid 
et al., 2013). Consistent with the notion that banks were still at risk, the media coverage of the new deposit 
insurance limit emphasized how consumers could protect their savings by splitting deposits across banks, 
by moving deposits to the largest banks most likely to be bailed out in case of distress, or by withdrawing 
deposits and investing the funds in other safe assets.1  
On 6 February 2011, Amagerbanken failed and, unlike in previous failures, the Financial Regulator 
announced that uninsured depositors would suffer haircuts of around 40%; the first application of a new 
set of European bail-in rules. This change in policy presumably changed perceptions about implicit 
guarantees. The event induced Moody’s to downgrade the long-term credit ratings of major Danish 
banks, reflecting a downward revision of the agency’s assumptions about systemic support from ‘high’ 
to ‘low’ (Moody’s, 2011).2 Danish media coverage emphasized that deposits in Amagerbanken below 
DKK 750,000 were safe and that most customers would experience no interruptions in their day-to-day 
                                                          
1 “Sådan sikrer du dine penge mod bankkrak”, TV2, 22 September 2010; ”Slut med fuld indskudsgaranti”, DR, 30 September 
2010. 
2 The long-term rating of two systemic banks, Danske Bank and FIH Erhvervsbank, was downgraded together with three 
large but non-systemic banks. The long-term rating of three other systemic banks, Nordea, Sydbank and Jyske Bank, were 
placed on review for a possible downgrade.  
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business with the bank; but also reported that shares in the bank were most likely worthless and that 
deposits above DKK 750,000 would be written down by around 40%.3 
Figure 1 summarizes the key events. The financial crisis starts in Denmark in early 2008 with the first 
bank failures and heightened uncertainty about the fragility of the banking system, reflected in the 
increase in the interest rate spread. The blanket guarantee issued at the peak of the crisis quickly 
eliminated most of the spread; however, bank failures continued to be common in 2010, when the blanket 
guarantee expired and deposit insurance was capped at DKK 750,000, and in 2011, when the bail-in rules 
were first applied at the event of Amagerbanken’s failure. 
Figure 1 around here 
3. Data 
We obtain information about bank account balances from the records of the Danish tax authorities. At 
the end of each year, all financial institutions in Denmark report the balance of all deposit accounts held 
by Danish residents to the Danish tax authorities. The reports are collected for the purpose of tax 
enforcement and, therefore, are compulsory and reliable. We consolidate the account-level information 
at the bank-individual level, the relevant level for deposit insurance purposes, by summing accounts held 
by the same individual in the same bank. For each individual, we thus observe the end-of-year 
consolidated account balance in each Danish bank for each of the years 2003-2011. To this dataset, we 
add comprehensive information about individuals from administrative registers (e.g. age, gender and 
income) as well as balance sheet information about banks from the Danish Central Bank. For 
computational tractability, we limit the analysis to a 10% random sample of the full adult population.4 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of deposits in 2007 and highlights how the fraction of deposits and 
accounts that are insured varies with the insurance limit. For each value of X, the blue line shows the 
value of deposits held on accounts with a balance above X as a fraction of all deposits in the banking 
system (that is, the numerator is the sum of Y for all accounts with balance Y>X). The red line shows 
the value of account balances above X as a fraction of all deposits in the banking system (that is, the 
numerator is the sum of Y-X for all accounts with balance Y>X). Put simply, for a given deposit 
insurance limit X, the blue line shows the share of deposits in partly uninsured accounts whereas the red 
                                                          
3 “Amagerbanken er krakket”, Politiken, 6 Februar 2011; ”Minister lover hjælp til bankkunder efter krak”, Politiken, 7 Februar 
2011.  
4 Table A1 in the Online Appendix shows that there are no material differences between the 10% estimation sample and the 
90% outside the estimation sample.  
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line shows the share of deposits that is uninsured. The dotted vertical line illustrates the insurance limit 
of DKK 750,000, introduced in October 2010. We observe that deposits on accounts with a balance 
above this limit constituted almost 40% of all deposits whereas account balances above the limit 
constituted more than 20% of all deposits. Hence, if depositors were to withdraw all balances above the 
insurance limit, banks would lose more than one fifth of all deposits; if they were to liquidate all accounts 
with some uninsured balances, the loss would be close to two fifths of all deposits.  
Figure 2 around here 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for a number of bank-level variables. Our sample includes 92 banks: 
Columns (1)-(2) describe the six largest banks in terms of total assets in 2007 whereas Columns (3)-(4) 
describe the remaining 86 banks. Motivated by the fact that the financial regulator named precisely six 
institutions when first drawing up a list of systemically important financial institutions in 2014, we 
consider the former group as systemic banks and the latter group as non-systemic banks.5,6 As shown in 
the bottom of the table, our sample of individuals owned around 656,000 deposit accounts in 2007, of 
which around 8,000 had balances above DKK 750,000. Systemic banks have a market share of around 
70%, both in terms of the total number of accounts and accounts with a balance above DKK 750,000.  
Table 1 around here 
The table highlights several important differences between systemic and non-systemic banks. Besides 
being much larger (by construction), systemic banks are also less capitalized (lower equity-asset ratio), 
slightly more liquid (lower loans-assets ratio) and slightly less profitable (lower return on assets). 
Moreover, systemic banks have a higher share of deposits on accounts above DKK 750,000 (37% vs 
28% in non-systemic banks) and a higher share of deposit balances above DKK 750,000 (23% vs 14% 
in non-systemic banks). 
4. Limiting deposit insurance: reallocation of deposits across accounts 
This section documents that the deposit insurance limit introduced in 2010 was associated with a 
significant reallocation of retail deposits across accounts: depositors responded by splitting deposits 
above the insurance limit across multiple accounts, but not by withdrawing deposits from the banking 
system. 
                                                          
5  Our micro-data are de-identified and we therefore cannot name the six systemic banks in our analysis nor compare with the 
six institutions officially designated systemically important in 2014. 
6 None of the Danish SIFIs are large enough to be on the global list of systemic banks G-SIB. 
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4.1 Distribution of deposit balances 
Figure 3 illustrates how the account-level distribution of deposits changed when deposit insurance was 
limited at DKK 750,000 in October 2010. For each year, the histograms show the number of accounts 
in 1000-DKK bins over a range of account values close to the limit. The distribution is smooth at the 
end of 2008 and 2009; however, considerable excess mass emerges at 750,000 DKK at the end of 2010 
and remains at the end of 2011. This is strongly suggestive that some depositors drew down account 
balances to the insurance limit to reduce exposure to bank failures. While the annual frequency of the 
account-level deposit information limits our ability to determine the timing of these responses, there are 
no signs of anticipatory effects by the end of 2009 despite the deposit insurance limit having been 
announced already in spring 2009.  
Figure 3 around here 
The bunching at DKK 750,000 could derive from two distinct types of depositor responses. Depositors 
either transferred uninsured balances to accounts in other banks or they withdrew uninsured balances 
from the banking system and invested them in other assets. The distinction is important because the 
former type of response merely reallocates deposits within the banking system whereas the latter reduces 
the aggregate value of deposits and may therefore create funding problems for the banking system as a 
whole. 
To help distinguish the two types of responses, we study the individual-level distribution of deposits in 
the same window and for the same period. If the account-level bunching at the insurance limit reflects 
reallocations across accounts, the individual-level distribution should exhibit no bunching since such 
reallocations do not change individual-level deposit totals. Conversely, if the account-level bunching 
reflects withdrawals from the banking system, we should observe the same bunching in the individual-
level distribution. Figure 4 shows that the individual-level distribution of deposit balances is smooth over 
the entire range both before and after the introduction of the insurance limit. This strongly suggests that 
the account-level bunching at the limit is driven by deposit reallocations across accounts rather than 
withdrawals of deposits from the banking system. 
Figure 4 around here 
4.2 Regression framework 
While the emergence of bunching of account balances around DKK 750,000 in 2010 is strongly 
suggestive of deposit reallocations in response to the insurance, it is important to emphasize that 
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reallocations of deposits across accounts do not necessarily give rise to bunching at the insurance limit.  
For instance, in the case of a depositor splitting a DKK 1,000,000 account into two DKK 500,000 
accounts we observe no new accounts at DKK 750,000. In order to gauge the full extent of the 
reallocation of deposits, we consider changes in the wider distribution of account balances in a regression 
framework. 
Our goal is to estimate to what extent the deposit insurance limit introduced in 2010 was associated with 
a reduction in deposits above the limit (which became uninsured) relative to deposits below the limit 
(which remained insured). In an account-level regression, we would face the difficulty that any account 
with a balance above the insurance limit includes deposits that remained insured (balances up to the limit) 
as well as deposits that became uninsured (balances in excess of the limit). For instance, an account with 
a balance of DKK 900,000 combines DKK 750,000 that remained insured and DKK 150,000 that 
became uninsured. For the purposes of the regressions, we therefore slice up each account in a number 
of deposit ranges, DKK 0-50,000, DKK 50,000-100,000, DKK 100,000-150,000 and so on, and compare, 
at the bank-level, how deposits in ranges that remained insured evolved relative to deposits in ranges that 
became uninsured. To be precise, an account with a balance of DKK 900,000 contributes DKK 750,000 
to ranges that remain insured and DKK 150,000 to ranges that become uninsured. 
Specifically, we estimate the following baseline model for the period 2008-2011: log(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑)𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 
The dependent variable is deposits (in logs) in bank b in year t in range k. We include ten ranges of width 
DKK 50,000 between DKK 500,000 and 999,999, hence the estimation includes ten observations per 
bank-year. The explanatory variables are: Above indicating that the range starts at DKK 750,000 or above; 
After indicating that the year is 2010 or later; and a set of controls capturing bank characteristics in 2007. 
The key variable is the interaction After × Above capturing the deposit growth in ranges above the 
threshold between the pre-reform and the post-reform period relative to the deposit growth in ranges 
below the threshold over the same period. Since ranges below the threshold are not directly affected by 
the deposit insurance reform, this can be interpreted as a difference-in-difference estimate of the effect 
of insurance on deposits in a given range.  
Table 2 reports the results from this baseline specification in Column (1). The coefficient on After shows 
that deposits below DKK 750,000 increased by almost 35% from the period 2008-2009 to the period 
2010-2011 (i.e., e0.292 - 1). Combining this estimate with the coefficient on After × Above shows that 
deposits above DKK 750,000 decreased by around 5% (i.e., e0.292 - 0.363 - 1). The difference in growth rates 
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is highly significant and suggestive that the removal of the unlimited deposit insurance had a large effect 
on the allocation of deposits. 
Table 2 around here 
To probe the robustness of these results, we sequentially add dummies to the baseline specification. 
Columns (2) and (3) add bank dummies and bank-range dummies that absorb cross-sectional variation. 
Column (4) further adds bank-time dummies that absorb all bank-level shocks. This specification controls 
exhaustively for bank characteristics (including the characteristics of the average customer), both in levels 
and changes, and effectively identifies from within-bank differences in the growth rate of deposits above 
and below the limit. The coefficient on the main variable of interest, After × Above, is almost identical 
across all specifications.7 
We also estimate a fully dynamic version of the specification in Column (3) where After is replaced by a 
vector of time dummies (2009 is the omitted category). Figure 5 illustrates the results: deposits above and 
below DKK 750,000 followed almost identical trends over the period 2006-2009 but then diverged 
sharply in 2010. Deposits below the threshold continued to increase at roughly the same rate whereas 
deposits above the threshold decreased rapidly both in absolute and in relative terms. In 2011, deposits 
below the threshold had increased by around 25% from the level in 2009 whereas deposits above the 
threshold had decreased by around 25%. Assuming that deposits above the limit would have grown at 
the same rate as deposits below the limit if deposit insurance had remained unlimited, the estimates imply 
that limiting insurance caused a 50% decrease in deposits above the limit.8 
Figure 5 around here 
Again, the results illustrated in Figure 5 could reflect reallocations of deposits across accounts or 
withdrawals from the banking system. To distinguish the two types of responses, we repeat the regression 
with the sole exception that we form the dependent variable by assigning individuals to their primary 
bank and summing individual-level rather than account-level deposits within each bank and range. To 
illustrate the difference, consider a depositor holding a single account with a balance of DKK 800,000 
who moves DKK 50,000 to a new account in another bank. In the analysis based on account-level values, 
this triggers a DKK 50,000 decrease in the range DKK 750,000 - 799,999 whereas, in this analysis based 
                                                          
7  Table A2 in the Appendix shows the same results when the data is collapsed to two time periods: pre-reform (2008-2009) 
and post-reform (2010-2011). 
8 Figure A1 in the Appendix displays the difference between the estimated trends below and above the insurance limit and 
the confidence intervals around these difference-in-difference estimates: with a t-value of 4.5, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that deposits below and above the limit grew at the same rate through 2010 and 2011. 
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on individual-level deposit values, it changes nothing because individual-level deposits remain at DKK 
800,000. By contrast, if the depositor withdraws DKK 50,000 from the deposit account and the money 
does not reappear on other accounts, it triggers a DKK 50,000 decrease in the range DKK 750,000 - 
799,999 in both analyses.  
As shown in Figure 6, the deposit insurance limit had no discernible effect on individual-level deposit 
balances: individual-level deposits below and above DKK 750,000 followed almost identical trends 
throughout the sample period.9 Together, Figures 5 and 6 confirm the finding in the previous section 
that the insurance limit caused a significant reallocation of deposits within the banking system but was 
not associated with a decrease in aggregate deposits.  
Figure 6 around here 
The figure also highlights the significant overall growth in deposits during the financial crisis: annual 
growth rates hovered around 10% both above and below the limit in the years 2007-2009. This is 
consistent with a flight to the relative safety of the banking system as other asset types became more risky 
(Gatev and Strahan, 2006). 
4.3 Splitting of accounts 
To reduce account balances above the insurance limit (Figure 5) without reducing their total deposits in 
the banking system (Figure 6), depositors necessarily must have split deposits across multiple accounts. 
We provide direct evidence on this mechanism in Figure 7 by showing the fraction of depositors who 
increased the number of deposit accounts in a given year, grouped by the size of their total deposits. We 
observe a surge in the splitting of accounts at the onset of the financial crisis in 2008 for all groups 
holding total deposits above the old insurance limit of DKK 300,000; a drop in 2009 when all deposits 
were explicitly guaranteed by the government; and a surge again in 2010 for groups holding total deposits 
above the new insurance limit of DKK 750,000.  
Figure 7 around here 
 
 
                                                          
9 Figure A2 in the Appendix displays the difference between the estimated trends below and above the insurance limit and 
the confidence intervals around these difference-in-difference estimates: the differential change above the limit is far from 
statistical significance. 
 14 
5. Too-Big-To-Fail: reallocation of deposits across banks 
This section shows that the reallocation of deposits across accounts in response to the insurance limit 
was also associated with a reallocation of deposits across banks: even as systemic banks lowered interest 
rates on large deposits relative to non-systemic banks, they were more successful at retaining and 
attracting deposits above the insurance limit. The results are suggestive that the implicit government 
guarantee of banks that are too-big-to-fail distorted competition for retail deposits.  
5.1 Distribution of deposit balances 
Figure 8 illustrates how the account-level distribution of deposits changed differentially for systemic and 
non-systemic banks when deposit insurance was limited at DKK 750,000 in October 2010. It is 
comparable to Figure 3 except that we express the number of accounts in each 1000-DKK bin as a 
fraction of all accounts with a balance above DKK 100,000 to facilitate comparison between systemic 
and non-systemic banks. In 2008 and 2009, the distributions are very similar for systemic and non-
systemic banks and, consistent with the evidence in Section 4.1, there is no bunching at any account 
value. In 2010, clear bunching emerges at DKK 750,000, but only in non-systemic banks: the fraction of 
accounts in non-systemic banks with a balance exactly at the new insurance limit increases by around 
700% between 2009 and 2010 with no corresponding increase in systemic banks.  
Figure 8 around here 
The finding that depositors in non-systemic banks drew deposit balances down to the insurance limit 
much more frequently than depositors in systemic banks represents our first suggestive evidence that 
implicit guarantees to systemic banks distort the competitive landscape. The results are consistent with 
depositor beliefs that deposits in systemic banks are safe, even if not covered by explicit guarantees, 
because banks with systemic importance are bailed out with a high probability in case of distress.  
5.2 Deposit quantities 
To explore further the role of implicit guarantees, we estimate the fully dynamic model of account-level 
responses (analogous to Figure 5) while allowing for differential time paths for systemic and non-systemic 
banks. The regression thus includes four terms - Above×Systemic, Below×Systemic, Above×Nonsystemic and 
Below×Nonsystemic – each of which is interacted with a vector of year dummies. As shown in Figure 9, 
deposits in all four categories, above and below the limit in systemic and non-systemic banks, followed 
roughly similar trends over the period 2006-2009. After the deposit insurance reform, deposits below the 
threshold continued to grow at roughly the same rate as before the reform in both systemic and non-
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systemic banks, increasing by around 25% through 2010 and 2011. By contrast, deposits above the 
threshold diverged sharply from the pre-reform trend in non-systemic banks, with a decrease of around 
30% through 2010 and 2011, but much less so in systemic banks, where there was a slight absolute 
increase over the same period. The resulting difference-in-difference estimates suggest that limiting 
deposit insurance caused deposits above the limit to decrease by more than 50% in non-systemic banks, 
but only by slightly more than 20% in systemic banks.10 
Figure 9 around here 
To probe the robustness of the finding that banks’ systemic importance is a key determinant of depositor 
responses to the insurance limit, we conduct four additional tests.  
First, one may be concerned that the divergence between systemic and non-systemic banks evidenced in 
Figure 9 is driven by other bank characteristics possessed disproportionately by systemic banks. To 
address this concern, we test whether the decrease in deposits above the limit remains significantly 
different for systemic and non-systemic banks when the decrease is also allowed to vary with other bank 
characteristics. Concretely, we estimate the most saturated version of the baseline model (with bank-time 
dummies) where After × Above is interacted with a dummy for being systemic, but also with dummies 
capturing three other possible determinants of depositor responses to the insurance limit: high 
capitalization, high liquidity and high profitability.  
Columns (1)-(2) in Table 3 show that high capitalization, high liquidity and high profitability tend to 
reduce the loss of deposits above the insurance threshold after the introduction of the insurance limit, 
possibly because these characteristics are associated with a lower perceived risk of failure. However, the 
estimated effect of being a systemic bank barely changes when we account for these other characteristics. 
Specifically, on the margin, a ratio of equity to assets above the median raises the negative difference-in-
difference estimate by 0.17 log points, a ratio of loans to assets below the median raises it by 0.14 log 
points and a return on assets above the median raises it by 0.05 log points. However, the marginal effect 
of being a systemic bank remains highly significant and increases slightly when these factors are included 
in the model.  
Table 3 around here 
                                                          
10 Figure A3 in the Appendix shows that both difference-in-difference estimates are statistically significant and so is the 
difference between them: with a t-value of 4.8, we can reject the null hypothesis that systemic and non-systemic banks 
experienced the same decrease in deposits above the limit relative to deposits below the limit. 
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Second, it is conceivable that the divergence between systemic and non-systemic banks owes itself to 
differences in customer characteristics: it is possible that non-systemic banks have customer types, for 
instance more risk-averse types, who respond more strongly to the loss of deposit insurance. This is 
effectively an interaction effect between customer characteristics (i.e., risk aversion) and the account-level 
balance (i.e., balance above the limit), which is not absorbed by the bank-year fixed effects. We address 
this concern by augmenting the model with interactions between After × Above and observed customer 
characteristics: gender, age and income.  
Columns (3)-(4) show that all three customer characteristics have a significant effect on the loss of 
deposits above the limit: having customers older than the median raises the negative difference-in-
difference estimate by 0.21 log points, having more female customers than the median raises it by 0.18 
log points and having higher-income customers than the median reduces it by 0.18 log points (based on 
the estimates in Column 3). However, the marginal effect of being a systemic bank remains highly 
significant and is of a similar magnitude as in the baseline model.  
Third, the striking difference between systemic and non-systemic banks could be due a perception among 
depositors that large banks are better managed and thus less likely to encounter financial difficulties than 
small banks regardless of any TBTF guarantees. This could be true if economies of scale allow larger 
banks to develop superior risk management practices that lower earnings volatility and exposure to losses.  
We investigate this alternative explanation by estimating depositor responses to the insurance limit for 
each of 15 small groups of similarly-sized banks. Specifically, we estimate the most saturated variant of 
the baseline specification (Column (4) in Table 2) augmented with interactions between After × Above 
and dummies indicating the size group (one dummy for the six largest banks in 2007, another dummy 
for the next six banks in the size distribution and so on).11 The group with the six largest banks 
corresponds to our definition of systemic banks.  
The 15 group-specific coefficients on After × Above, plotted against bank size in Figure 10, provide 
evidence of a highly non-linear relationship with the systemic banks standing out as a clear outlier. As 
shown in the figure, regressing the estimated coefficients on size within the sample of non-systemic banks 
yields a negative gradient with predicted coefficients around -0.3 for the smallest banks and around -0.5 
for the largest non-systemic banks. However, the estimated coefficient for systemic banks is very far from 
the extrapolated regression line with a coefficient around -0.2. This suggests that depositors considered 
                                                          
11 For confidentiality reasons, we cannot show estimates for individual banks or very small groups of banks. 
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systemic banks to be safer than other banks and in particular much safer than large non-systemic banks. 
The most natural interpretation is that systemic banks enjoyed more generous implicit bailout guarantees 
than non-systemic banks.12 
Figure 10 around here 
We provide a more formal test by comparing systemic and non-systemic banks within the sample of the 
12 largest banks. While the six systemic banks are considerably larger than the following six non-systemic 
banks, the latter are almost certainly large enough to exhaust the economies of scale (Wheelock and 
Wilson, 2001). It is therefore much less likely that there are qualitative differences in management 
practices within this smaller sample of large banks than within the full sample of banks. Column (5) in 
Table 3 shows that the difference between systemic and non-systemic banks widens when the sample is 
restricted to the 12 largest banks. This is consistent with the notion that the muted responses by uninsured 
depositors in systemic banks owe themselves to implicit bailout guarantees, but is difficult to reconcile 
with the alternative explanation highlighting better risk management practices and lower probability of 
distress.  
Fourth, acknowledging that there is no perfect delineation of systemic and non-systemic banks, and that 
reallocations of deposits are ultimately shaped by (possibly heterogeneous) depositor perceptions of bank 
safety, we explore to what extent our results are sensitive to the threshold at which systemic and non-
systemic banks are delineated. Columns (6)-(9) in Table 3 show that the difference between systemic and 
non-systemic banks is larger when systemic banks are defined as the largest four or five banks and smaller 
when defined as the largest seven or eight banks, but strongly significant in any of these cases. These 
results are consistent with depositors holding heterogeneous beliefs about whether the handful of banks 
just below the top-3 are too-big-to-fail and with the fraction of depositors believing that a bank is too-
big-to-fail an increasing function of bank size.13 
Finally, we provide evidence on the mechanisms underlying the differential losses of uninsured deposits 
in systemic and non-systemic banks. In Columns (10)-(11), we show that the same qualitative result 
emerges when we only consider new accounts, those opened by depositors in the course of the year, and 
existing accounts, those that existed already at the beginning of the year: systemic banks were more 
                                                          
12 The standard errors of the point estimates are reported in Figure A4 in the Appendix 
13 As a final robustness test, we check whether the divergence between systemic and non-systemic banks in 2010 could be due 
to pre-existing differences in the account-level distribution of deposits. Figures A5-A6 in the Appendix show that the two 
groups of banks had almost identical deposit distributions before 2010, but very different distributions after.  
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successful at attracting as well as retaining uninsured deposits. Intuitively, the effect of the insurance limit 
is much stronger for new accounts than for existing accounts in both types of banks.14 
5.3 Deposit prices 
After studying how deposit quantities changed differentially around the deposit insurance reform, we 
now turn to deposit prices. We note that differential changes in interest rates could potentially explain 
the differential changes in deposits. It is possible that systemic banks suffered smaller losses of uninsured 
deposit balances because they raised interest rates relative to other banks. Yet, it would be problematic 
to include prices as controls in the regressions concerning quantities because they are themselves 
endogenous to withdrawals of uninsured deposits. Conceptually, we therefore treat deposit prices as 
outcomes that are determined jointly with deposit quantities. 
Since we do not observe interest rates directly in the micro-data, we first need to impute them from 
information about interest payments and account balances. Specifically, we impute account-level interest 
rates in the following way: 
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 =  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 
where i refers to the individual, b to the bank and t to the year. We only observe account balances at the 
end of each year and therefore use the average balance at the end of year t and the end of year t-1 as a 
proxy for the average account balance over year t. As the proxy is less prone to measurement error when 
the account balance is roughly stable within the year, we choose to consider only account-years with a 
change in the balance of less than 20%.15 In the Appendix, we document that the imputation delivers 
economically meaningful interest rates: the distribution of imputed interest rates has a mode around 2 
percent and very little mass above 6 percent (Figure A7); and the within-year median exhibits roughly the 
                                                          
14 To be specific, new deposits above DKK 750,000 decreased by more than 60% (i.e., e-0.976 – 1) relative to new deposits 
below in non-systemic banks and by 40% (i.e., e-0.976 + 0.473 – 1) in systemic banks. The decrease in existing deposits above 
DKK 750,000 relative to existing deposits below was slightly more than 25% (i.e. e-0.319 – 1) in non-systemic banks and around 
10% (i.e., e-0.319+0.211 – 1) in systemic banks. 
15 If, for instance, the balance is DKK 250,000 at the end of year t-1 and the owner made a single transfer of DKK 500,000 
to the account during year t to bring the balance at the end of year t to DKK 750,000, our proxy for the average account 
balance is DKK 500,000. However, the true average balance may be close to DKK 250,000 if the transfer happened in early 
January or close to DKK 750,000 if the transfer happened in late December. If interest over year t amounts to DKK 10,000, 
the imputed interest rate is 2 percent; however, the true interest rate may range between 1.3 and 4 percent depending on the 
timing of the transfer. Clearly, this type of noise is larger the more the account balance changes over the year. 
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same trend over time as the government bond rate (Figure A8). Equipped with this measure, we explore 
the effects of the deposit insurance limit on interest rates.  
In a first step, we estimate the differential change in interest rates around the introduction of the deposit 
insurance limit in non-systemic banks relative to systemic banks. To distinguish the general trend in 
interest rates from the interest rates on deposits that became uninsured, we provide specific estimates for 
different ranges of account values by estimating the following model: 
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑏𝑏𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑏𝑏𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏 + 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 
where the dependent variable is the median imputed interest rate among all the accounts in bank b in year 
t in range k. The key parameters of interest are the difference-in-difference estimates 𝛽𝛽3𝑏𝑏 which express 
the interest rates change in range k from 2008-2009 to 2010-2011 for non-systemic relative to systemic 
banks.  
As shown in Figure 11, the point estimates are positive in all ranges, but clearly increasing in account size: 
less than 0.2 percentage points (and statistically insignificant) for accounts below the insurance limit, 
increasing to more than 0.5 percentage points (and statistically significant) for large accounts above DKK 
1,500,000. The results are suggestive that non-systemic banks differentially raised the interest rate 
premium to deposit balances above DKK 750,000. This interpretation is consistent with the finding that 
the differential change in interest rates is zero for accounts below the insurance limit and increasing in 
the deposit share above the insurance limit. 
Figure 11 around here 
To verify that the differential increase in interest rates on large accounts is not driven by differential 
underlying trends, we also estimate a dynamic version of the model where Systemic and Nonsystemic are 
interacted with a full vector of time dummies for accounts larger than DKK 1,000,000. To abstract from 
the large swings in market interest rates over the estimation period, we use the difference between deposit 
rates and government bond rates as our outcome.16 Figure 12 illustrates the results: deposit rates increased 
steeply relative to the bond rates over the period 2006-2009, perhaps reflecting increased competition for 
retail deposits as other funding sources became scarcer, but both the absolute level and the trend over 
time were strikingly similar across systemic and non-systemic banks. However, coinciding with the 
                                                          
16 Note that subtracting the same constant for all observations in the same year changes the estimated trends for systemic 
and non-systemic banks, but not the difference between them. 
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deposit insurance limit in 2010, there are clear signs of divergence with interest rates in systemic banks 
decreasing by around 0.4 percentage points relative to non-systemic banks.17  
Figure 12 around here 
We run the same model for accounts between DKK 500,000 and DKK 750,000 that remained insured 
throughout the period and show the results in the Appendix. Also in this range, interest rates on deposits 
generally increased relative to bond rates until 2009 and then decreased through 2011; however, 
consistent with the evidence in Figure 11, there is no sign of divergence between systemic and non-
systemic banks in 2010 (Figures A10-A11 in the Appendix). By implication, the difference between 
interest rates on uninsured accounts and insured accounts followed a similar trend in systemic and non-
systemic banks until 2009 and then diverged in 2010 (Figures A12-A13 in the Appendix). 
While the previous section showed that systemic banks retained and attracted more deposits above the 
insurance limit introduced in 2010, the results in this section show that this happened even as systemic 
banks differentially lowered interest rates on such deposits.  
5.4 The timing of depositor responses 
A key limitation of the administrative account-level data is the annual frequency. While the coverage of 
the dataset, all deposit accounts in Danish banks, makes it uniquely suited to study deposit reallocations, 
the low frequency limits our ability to determine the precise timing of depositor responses. This is 
important for several reasons. First, the DKK 750,000 deposit insurance limit was announced in spring 
2009 and introduced in October 2010, leaving time for important anticipation effects. However, the 
annual data only allow us to test for anticipation responses as of December 2009. Second, the first 
application of the bail-in rules in February 2011 may have had a significant impact on depositor beliefs 
about bank safety, but the annual frequency does not allows us to disentangle the effects of the insurance 
limit and the bail-in rules. Third, it is possible that the depositor responses estimated at the annual 
frequency conceal even larger responses at higher frequencies, such as short-lived panics around shifts in 
depositor beliefs about government guarantees. 
We address these shortcomings using bank-level information on time deposits at the monthly frequency. 
The dataset derives from the Danish Central Bank and covers around 20 large banks that account for 
                                                          
17 Figure A9 in the Appendix displays the difference between the estimated trends for systemic and non-systemic banks and 
the confidence intervals around the differences: interest rates are significantly different in both 2010 and 2011 but not 
before. 
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more than 90 percent of all lending (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2013). While the monthly dataset does not 
distinguish time deposits above and below the insurance limit, time deposits are often savings accounts 
with a relatively large balance suggesting that it can serve as a proxy for uninsured deposits. Indeed, 
regressing the share of time deposits in total deposits (retrieved from the bank-level monthly dataset) on 
the share of deposits above DKK 750,000 in total deposits (derived from the account-level annual 
dataset) yields a highly significant coefficient of 0.65 and an R-squared of 0.40.  
Figure 13 illustrates the results of a simple fixed effects regression with time deposits (in logs) as the 
dependent variable and a set of time dummies interacted with dummies for systemic and non-systemic 
banks as independent variables. Time deposits in systemic and non-systemic banks followed very similar 
trends until June 2010, but then dropped sharply in non-systemic banks until December 2010 while 
increasing slightly in systemic banks. At the failure of Amagerbanken in February 2011, when bail-in rules 
were applied for the first time, there was a small decrease in time deposits in both systemic and non-
systemic banks; however, the gap that opened up around the deposit insurance reform remains roughly 
constant throughout the sample period.18  
Figure 13 around here 
While the analysis of monthly bank-level data is less clean than the main analysis of annual account-level 
data - it relies on cross-bank comparisons of growth rates in time deposits rather than more precise 
within-bank comparisons of deposits above and below the insurance limit - it is informative about the 
questions raised above. Specifically, it is suggestive that there were important anticipation responses to 
the deposit insurance limit starting a few months before its introduction; that the disproportional loss of 
uninsured deposits by non-systemic banks owes itself to the deposit insurance limit rather than the bail-
in rules; and that the annual frequency of the account-level data is unlikely to conceal large losses of 
deposit above the insurance limit in short-lived panics (although the monthly frequency does not allow 
us to detect daily or weekly swings in deposit quantities).  
6. Pass-through of deposit shocks to bank lending 
The results presented above imply that the deposit insurance limit caused a large reallocation of deposits, 
from accounts above the limit to accounts below and from non-systemic to systemic banks. In this 
section, we test whether the shock to bank funding passed through to bank lending. For identification, 
                                                          
18 Figure A14 in the Appendix displays the difference between the estimated trends for systemic and non-systemic banks 
and the confidence intervals around these difference-in-difference estimates. 
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we exploit that the funding shock was heterogeneous: banks with a larger share of deposits above the 
insurance limit were more exposed to the reallocation of deposits across accounts. 
We first estimate a simple cross-sectional equation that relates the percentage change in total lending over 
the period 2007-2011 to the share of deposits over DKK 750,000 in 2007. Importantly, in light of the 
results indicating that systemic banks were much less exposed to the reallocation of uninsured deposits 
than non-systemic banks, we adopt a specification that allows the effect to vary flexibly across the two 
types of banks.  
As shown in Table 4, a higher share of deposits over DKK 750,000 in 2007 was associated with a 
significantly lower growth in lending over the period 2007-2011 for non-systemic banks. Consistent with 
the previous results that systemic banks were less affected by reallocations of uninsured deposits, we find 
a much smaller and insignificant effect on lending for this group.19 For non-systemic banks, the point 
estimate in Column (1) implies that banks with a share of deposits above DKK 750,000 at the 75th 
percentile (a share of around 20%) experienced a lending growth that was around 8 percentage points 
lower than banks at the 25th percentile (a share of around 6%).20 This result continues to hold when we 
introduce controls for other bank characteristics in Column (2). 
To estimate the structural parameter of interest, the elasticity of lending with respect to deposits, we 
employ an instrumental variables framework. Specifically, we estimate the effect of growth in deposits 
over the period 2007-2011, instrumented with the share of deposits over DKK 750,000 in 2007, on the 
growth in lending over the same period. We focus on non-systemic banks since we do not have an 
instrument for deposit growth in systemic banks. As shown in Columns (3)-(4), the share of deposits 
over DKK 750,000 in 2007 is a strong predictor of subsequent growth in total deposits (first stage). As 
shown in Columns (5)-(6), a one percent drop in deposits due to reallocations of uninsured accounts is 
associated with a drop in lending of around 0.35 percent (second stage).    
7. Conclusion 
We study how implicit government guarantees in the form of too-big-to-fail status create distortions on 
the market for retail deposits. We first document that the introduction of an insurance limit caused a 
significant reallocation of deposits across accounts, without changing the total value of deposits in the 
banking system. Deposits above the new insurance limit decreased by around 50% relative to deposits 
                                                          
19 Note, however, that precision is low due to the very small number of observations identifying this coefficient. 
20 We are not allowed to report the exact percentiles for confidentiality reasons. The average share of deposits above DKK 
750,000 is 6.45% for the 5 banks around the 25th percentile and 19.55% for the 5 banks around 75th percentile. 
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below the limit, but depositors with total balances above the limit did not reduce their total balances 
relative to depositors with total balances below the limit. We then show that the reallocation of deposits 
across accounts was associated with a reallocation of deposits across banks: systemic banks were much 
more successful at retaining and attracting uninsured deposits than non-systemic banks, even as they 
differentially reduced the interest rate on uninsured deposits. The results show that, in a crisis, too-big-
to-fail banks have a major competitive advantage on the market for retail deposits. 
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Figure 1: Time line of events
Notes: The figure shows for each month the number of Danish banks (red bars - left axis), the spread between the Danish
interbank interest rate (CIBOR) and the policy rate (blue curve - right axis) as well as major events related to depositor
perceptions of bank safety.
Source:  The number of bank failures are from Rangvid et al. (2013). Interest rates are from Statistics Denmark.
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Figure 2: Deposits affected by the deposit insurance limit
Notes : Based on the account-level distribution of deposits in 2007, the figure shows for each account value X, the fraction of
all deposits held on accounts with a balance above X (blue line) and the fraction of deposit balances above X (red line). The
dashed line indicates the insurance limit of DKK 750,000 introduced in 2010.
Figure 3: Account-level distribution of deposits around DKK 750,000
Notes : The figure shows the empirical distribution of account-level deposit balances in a narrow window around DKK 750,000
for each of the years 2008-2009 (where all deposits were guaranteed by the government) and for 2010-2011 (where the
insurance limit was DKK 750,000). The sample is divided into DKK 1,000 (approximately USD 150) bins and counts are recorded
for each bin. Thus, each point indicates the number of deposit accounts with balances within DKK 500 of the stated amount.
Figure 4: Individual-level distribution of deposits around DKK 750,000
Notes : The figure shows the empirical distribution of individual-level deposit balances in a narrow window around DKK
750,000 for each of the years 2008-2009 (where all deposits were guaranteed by the government) and for 2010-2011 (where
the insurance limit was DKK 750,000). The sample is divided into DKK 1,000 (approximately USD 150) bins and counts are
recorded for each bin. Thus, each point indicates the number of individuals with total deposit balances within DKK 500 of the
stated amount.
Figure 5: Account-level deposits above and below DKK 750,000
Notes : The figure illustrates the results from an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is deposits (in logs)
at the bank-range level summing over account-level balances for accounts held in a given bank and falling in a given range. We
use ten DKK 50,000 ranges over the interval DKK 500,000 – 1,000,000. The explanatory variables are a set of bank-range fixed
effects, a set of year dummies interacted with indicators that the range is below and above DKK 750,000 respectively (where
2009 is the omitted time category). The figure shows the point estimates on the interaction terms and 95% confidence
intervals based on standard errors clustered at the bank-level. The two lines thus indicate the average trend in account-level
deposits below (blue) and above (red) the insurance limit relative to the level in 2009. The resulting difference-in-difference
estimators are reported in Figure A1 in the Appendix.
Figure 6: Individual-level deposits above and below DKK 750,000
Notes : The figure illustrates the results from an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is deposits (in logs)
at the bank-range level summing over individual-level total deposits for individuals who use a given bank as primary bank and
have total deposits fall in a given range. We use ten DKK 50,000 ranges over the interval DKK 500,000 – 1,000,000. The
explanatory variables are a set of bank-range fixed effects, a set of year dummies interacted with indicators that the range is
below and above DKK 750,000 respectively (where 2009 is the omitted time category). The figure shows the point estimates
on the interaction and 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the bank-level. The two lines thus
indicate the average trend in individual-level deposits for individuals with total deposits below (blue) and above (red) the
insurance limit (relative to the level in 2009). The resulting difference-in-difference estimators are reported in Figure A2 in the
Appendix.
Figure 7: Depositors increasing the number of accounts
Notes : The figure shows the fraction of depositors increasing the number of accounts for different ranges of total deposits
across all accounts. All fractions are measured relative to 2007.  
Figure 8: Account-level distribution of deposits around DKK 750,000, by systemic importance
Notes: The figure shows the empirical distribution of account balances in a narrow window around DKK 750,000 for each of
the years 2008-2009 (where all deposits were guaranteed by the government) and for 2010-2011 (where the insurance limit
was DKK 750,000) for systemic and non-systemic banks separately. Densities are measured relative to the total number of
accounts with a balance above DKK 100,000 to facilitate comparisons between the two groups. Systemic banks are the 6
largest banks by total assets in 2007. Non-systemic banks are the remaining 86 banks in the sample. The sample of deposit
accounts is divided into DKK 1,000 (approximately USD 150) bins and counts of account balances are recorded for each bin.
Thus, each point indicates the number of deposit accounts with balances within DKK 500 of the stated amount.
Figure 9: Deposits in systemic and non-systemic banks
Notes : The figure illustrates the results from an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is deposits (in logs)
at the bank-range level (ten DKK 50,000 ranges over the interval DKK 500,000 – 1,000,000). The explanatory variables are a set
of bank-range fixed effects and a set of year dummies interacted (where 2009 is the omitted category) with four separate
dummies: (i) a dummy indicating that the range is below DKK 750,000 and the bank is systemic; (i) a dummy indicating that
the range is above DKK 750,000 and the bank is systemic; (i) a dummy indicating that the range is below DKK 750,000 and the
bank is non-systemic; (iv) a dummy indicating that the range is above DKK 750,000 and the bank is non-systemic. The figure
shows the point estimates on the triple interaction terms and 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at
the bank-level. The four lines thus indicate the average trend in deposits below (full line) and above (dashed) the insurance
threshold in systemic (blue) and non-systemic (red) banks relative to the level in 2009. The resulting difference-in-difference
and difference-in-difference-in-differences estimators are reported in Figure A3 in the Appendix.
Figure 10: Difference-in-difference estimates by bank size
Notes : The figure illustrates the results from an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is deposits (in logs)
at the bank-range level (ten DKK 50,000 ranges over the interval DKK 500,000 – 1,000,000). The explanatory variables are a set
of bank-range fixed effects, a set of bank-time fixed effects and a set of triple interactions between (i) a dummy indicating that
the year is 2010 or 2011 (After reform ); (ii) a dummy indicating that the range is above DKK 750,000 (Above Limit ); and (iii) a
set of dummies indicating bank size measured in terms of total assets. Specifically, we include 15 bank size dummies
corresponding to 15 groups with 6 banks each. The triple interactions represent size-specific difference-in-difference
estimates of the effect of the insurance limit on deposits over the limit. The blue dots plot the point estimates on the triple
interactions against the (average) size of the banks in the group. The red line is the best linear fit through the blue dots except
the one corresponding to the largest six (systemic) banks. Standard errors are reported in Figure A4 in the Appendix.
Figure 11: Interest rates, DiD estimates, non-systemic vs systemic, by account balance
Notes : The figure illustrates the results from a series of ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the bank-
specific imputed interest rate in a given range of deposit balances. The explanatory variables are a set of year dummies, an
indicator that the bank is non-systemic interacted with an indicator that the year is 2010 or 2011. The regressions are
conducted at seven different ranges of account balances: six ranges of width DKK 250,000 between DKK 250,000 and and DKK
1,499,999 and one range covering all deposits above 1,750,000. The figures shows the point estimates on the interaction
terms in different deposit ranges and 95% confidence bounds.
Figure 12: Interest rates on accounts with balances above DKK 1 million
Notes : The figure illustrates the results from an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is the bank-level
interest rate on deposit accounts with a balance above DKK 1,000,000 net of the government rate. The explanatory variables
are a set of year dummies interacted with indicators that the bank is systemic and non-systemic respectively (no constant
term). The figure shows the point estimates on the interaction terms and 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors
clustered at the bank-level. The two lines thus indicate the average trend in interest rates for systemic (blue) and non-systemic
banks (red). The interest rate differences between systemic and non-systemic banks with standard errors are reported in
Figure A9 in the Appendix.
Figure 13: Difference-in-difference estimates by bank size
Notes : The figure illustrates the results from an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is the bank-level
value of time deposits (in logs). The explanatory variables are a set of year dummies interacted with indicators that the bank is
systemic and non-systemic respectively as well as bank fixed effects. The figure shows the point estimates on the interaction
terms and 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the bank-level. The two lines thus indicate the
average trend in time deposits for systemic (blue) and non-systemic banks (red). The resulting difference-in-difference
estimators are reported in Figure A14 in the Appendix.
Table 1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean SD Mean SD
Accounting information:
Total assets (in DKK billion) 592 906 4 6
Equity-assets ratio 0.05 0.01 0.16 0.06
Loans-assets ratio 0.51 0.11 0.64 0.15
Return on assets 0.008 0.003 0.011 0.008
Exposure to deposit insurance limit:
Share of deposits  > DKK 750,000 0.23 0.06 0.14 0.10
Share of deposits on accounts > DKK 750,000 0.37 0.05 0.28 0.14
Number of accounts > DKK 750,000 
Number of accounts
Number of banks
Systemic banks Non-systemic banks
Total Total
Notes: Systemic banks are the six largest banks by total assets in 2007. Non-systemic banks are all other banks. Total 
assets is total bank-level assets. Equity-asset ratio is the ratio of total equity to total assets. Loans-assets ratio is the
ratio of total lending to total assets. Return on assets is the ratio of accounting profits to total assets. Share of deposits
> DKK 750,000 is account balances above DKK 750,000 divided by total deposits. Share of deposits on accounts > DKK
750,000 is depsits on accounts above DKK 750,000 divided by total deposits. Number of accounts > DKK 750,000 is the
number of accounts with a balance exceeding DKK 750,000. Number of accounts is the number of accounts with any
balance. All variables are recorded in 2007.  
6 86
5,946 2,103
470,444 185,494
Table 2: Baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After reform × Above limit -0.363*** -0.373*** -0.378*** -0.366***
(0.0462) (0.0430) (0.0501) (0.0500)
After reform 0.292*** 0.304*** 0.305***
(0.0403) (0.0394) (0.0456)
Above limit -0.578*** -0.593***
(0.0214) (0.0187)
Equity / debt (in 2007) 1.941
(1.452)
Loans / assets (in 2007) 1.302
(0.834)
Log of assets (in 2007) 0.802***
(0.0398)
Constant 1.154
(0.773)
Observations 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507
R-squared 0.869 0.951 0.970 0.990
Bank FE NO YES YES YES
Bank-Range FE NO NO YES YES
Bank-Time FE NO NO NO YES
Deposits (in logs)
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients from ordinary least squares regressions as well as robust standard errors
clustered at the bank-level (in parentheses). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of bank deposits in DKK 50,000 ranges
of the interval DKK 500,000 – 1,000,000. Above limit is an indicator for deposit ranges above DKK 750,000. After reform is an
indicator for the years 2010 and 2011. Equity / debt measures the ratio of equity to debt. Loans / assets meaures the ratio of
loans to assets. Log of assets is the natural logarithm of total assets. Columns (1)-(4) include all accounts. Column (5) only includes
an account in year t if it belongs to individual who owned no accounts with a balance exceeding DKK 750,000 in year t-1. The
sample period is 2008-2011. Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Table 3: Robustness and mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Baseline 12 largest  
banks top-4 top-5 top-7 top-8 new accts existing accts
After reform × Above limit -0.383*** -0.561*** -0.488*** -0.608*** -0.481*** -0.378*** -0.381*** -0.382*** -0.385*** -0.976*** -0.319***
(0.0530) (0.115) (0.0983) (0.144) (0.141) (0.0519) (0.0524) (0.0537) (0.0543) (0.123) (0.0504)
After reform × Above limit × Systemic 0.243*** 0.271** 0.231** 0.259** 0.341** 0.269*** 0.258*** 0.201*** 0.208*** 0.473** 0.211***
(0.0599) (0.107) (0.109) (0.121) (0.144) (0.0569) (0.0576) (0.0751) (0.0713) (0.190) (0.0536)
After reform × Above limit × High capitalization 0.172* 0.117
(0.0913) (0.0806)
After reform × Above limit × High liquidity 0.141 0.0821
(0.0939) (0.0885)
After reform × Above limit × High profitability 0.0548 0.0447
 (0.0935) (0.0847)
After reform × Above limit × High average age 0.208** 0.182**
(0.0919) (0.0847)
After reform × Above limit × High share of female 0.185** 0.169**
 (0.0879) (0.0821)
After reform × Above limit × High average income -0.177** -0.132
 (0.0880) (0.0869)
Observations 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 480 3,507 3,507 3,507 3,507 2,359 3,490
R-squared 0.990 0.990 0.991 0.991 0.995 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.955 0.990
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank-Range FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Bank-Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Definition of systemic banks:Heterogeneity in bank and customer 
characteristics
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients from ordinary least squares regressions as well as robust standard errors clustered at the bank-level (in parentheses). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of bank deposits in DKK 50,000 ranges of the
interval DKK 500,000 – 1,000,000. Above limit is an indicator for deposit ranges above DKK 750,000. After reform is an indicator for the years 2010 and 2011. Systemic is an indicator for being among the largest banks in 2007 in terms of total assets where largest
means 4 (Column 6), 5 (Column 7), 6 (Columns 1-5), 7 (Column 8) and 8 (Column 9). High capitalization is an indicator for having a ratio of equity to assets above the sample median in 2007. High liquidity is an indicator for having a ratio of loans to deposits below the
sample median in 2007. High profitability is an indicator for having a return to assets above the sample median in 2007. Interest rate is the (bank-range specific) median interest rate on deposits (imputed). High average age is an indicator for having customers with
average age above the sample median in 2007. High share of female is an indicator for having a share of female customers above the sample median in 2007. High average income is an indicator for having customers with average income above the sample median in
2007. The sample period is 2008-2011. Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Mechanisms:
Table 4: Exposure to the deposit insurance limit and lending growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrumented change in log deposits (2007-2011) 0.370*** 0.345**
(0.133) (0.161)
Share of total deposits  > DKK 750,000 -1.483*** -1.489***
(0.429) (0.371)
Share of total deposits  > DKK 750,000 × Non-systemic -0.549** -0.519*
(0.227) (0.288)
Share of total deposits  > DKK 750,000 × Systemic -0.153 -0.214
(1.328) (1.279)
Equity / debt (in 2007) 0.708 -0.217 0.858
(0.620) (0.994) (0.603)
Loans / assets (in 2007) -0.284 0.393 -0.343
(0.259) (0.303) (0.225)
Systemic (in 2007) -0.0867 -0.0285
(0.305) (0.296)
Constant 0.181*** 0.246 0.577*** 0.362 -0.0326 0.0602
(0.0381) (0.222) (0.0764) (0.345) (0.0610) (0.227)
Observations 92 92 86 86 86 86
R-squared 0.039 0.091 0.098 0.114 0.006 0.114
Notes : This table reports the estimated coefficients from regressions aiming to capture the effect of the deposit insurance reform on bank lending. Columns (1)-(2) present the results from the
OLS reduced form for the full sample of 92 banks. The dependent variable is the change in lending (in logs) over the period 2007-2011 and the key dependent varibable is the share of total
deposits > DKK 750,000 in 2007 interacted with indicators for systemic and non-systemic banks. Columns (3)-(4) present the results from the first stage of the IV regression for the sample of 86
non-systemic banks. The dependent variable is the change in the log of total deposits over the period 2007-2011 and the key independent variable is the share of total deposits > DKK 750,000 in
2007. Columns (5)-(6) present the results from the second stage of the IV regression. The dependent variable is the change in lending (in logs) over the period 2007-2011 and the key independent
variable is the change in total deposits (in logs) over the same period instrumented with the share of total deposits > DKK 750,000 in 2007. Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
OLS reduced form
first stage
Change in log deposits
2007-2011
Instrumental variable regression
Change in log lending
2007-2011
second stage
Change in log lending
2007-2011
Apppendix
Figure A1: Account-level deposits above and below DKK 750,000
Figure A2: Individual-level deposits above and below DKK 750,000
Notes : Figures A1 and A2 show the difference-in-difference estimates corresponding to Figures 5 and 6: the estimated change
in deposits above DKK 750,000 (in log points) relative to the change in deposits below the limit (measured relative to 2009)
based on account-level and individual-level deposits respectively. 
Figure A3: Deposits in systemic and non-systemic banks
Figure A4: Difference-in-difference estimates by bank size
Notes : Figure A3 shows the difference-in-difference and difference-in-difference-in-difference estimates corresponding to
Figure 7: the estimated change in deposits above DKK 750,000 (in log-points) relative to the change in deposits below the
limit (measured relative to 2009) in systemic banks (blue line) and non-systemic banks (red line) as well as the difference
between these two lines (black line). Figure A4 shows the bank-size specific estimates from Figure 10 with standard errors.
Figure A5: Distribution of accounts 2008-2009, by systemic importance
Figure A6: Distribution of accounts 2011, by systemic importance
Notes : Figure A5 and A6 show the distribution of account-level deposit balances (fractions) for systemic and non-systemic
banks respectively over the range DKK 500,000 - DKK 999,999 for the years 2008-2009 (Figure A5) and 2011 (Figure A6).
Figure A7: Imputed interest rate (median) and government bond rate
Figure A8: Distribution of imputed interest rates
Notes : Figure A7 shows the distribution of imputed interest rates (censored at the 99th percentile). Figure A8 compares the
median imputed interest rate across all deposit acounts to the 2-year government bond rate. 
Figure A9: Interest rates on accounts above DKK 1,000,000
Notes : Figure A9 shows the difference between the interest rate on deposit accounts with a balance above DKK 1,000,000 in
non-systemic banks and systemic banks respectively. 
Figure A10: Difference-in-difference estimates by bank size
Figure A11: Difference-in-difference estimates by bank size
Notes : Figure A10 shows the analogue of Figure 12, but for deposit balances between DKK 500,000 and 750,000. Figure A11
shows the analogue of Figure A9 but for deposit balances between DKK 500,000 and 750,000.
Figure A12: Difference-in-difference estimates by bank size
Figure A13: Interest rates on accounts above DKK 1,000,000 vs below DKK 750,000
Notes : Figure A12 shows the analogue of Figure 12, but for the difference between the interest rate above DKK 1,000,000 and
the interest rate between DKK 500,000 and 750,000. Figure A13 shows the analogue of Figure A9 but for the difference
between the interest rate above DKK 1,000,000 and the interest rate between DKK 500,000 and 750,000.
Figure A14: Term deposits
Notes : Figure A14 shows the difference-in-difference estimates corresponding to Figure 13: the estimated change in time
deposits (in log-points) in non-systemic banks relative to systemic banks. 
Table A1: Comparison of 10% estimation sample and the remianing 90%
10% in estimation 
sample
90% outside estimation 
sample
Difference 
in means
P-value that 
Difference=0
Age 43.94 44.05 -0.11 0.02
(24.97) (25.04)
Female 0.56 0.56 0.00 0.04
(0.5) (0.5)
Partner 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.39
(0.5) (0.5)
Education, short 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.05
(0.4) (0.4)
Education, medium 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.16
(0.41) (0.41)
Education, long 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.08
(0.29) (0.29)
Retired 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.00
(0.46) (0.46)
Self-employed 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.25
(0.13) (0.13)
Unemployed, 24m 32.78 32.70 0.08 0.85
(146.53) (146.44)
# Deposit accounts at systemic banks 0.86 0.86 0.00 0.27
(0.57) (0.57)
# Deposit accounts 1.21 1.21 0.00 0.75
(0.59) (0.58)
Total deposits (DKK) 139,561 139,970 -408.62 0.48
(296592.4) (296231.46)
Total bank debt (DKK) 49,409 49,389 20.02 0.92
(165894.21) (167029.36)
Total debt (DKK) 52,176 52,710 -534.65 0.17
(201432.21) (209990.57)
Total assets (DKK) 427,943 429,236 -1292.59 0.57
(1061014.96) (1060683.17)
After-tax income (DKK) 117,456 117,800 -344.08 0.06
(87940.62) (88825.19)
Stock market participation 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.17
(0.44) (0.44)
Total stock holdings (DKK) 30,443 30,895 -451.75 0.08
(111849.1) (112755.04)
Table A2: Deposit growth above vs below insurance limit 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln_deposits ln_deposits ln_deposits ln_deposits
After reform × Above limit -0.372*** -0.369*** -0.379*** -0.355***
(0.0609) (0.0327) (0.0308) (0.0191)
After reform 0.321*** 0.322*** 0.321***
(0.0421) (0.0242) (0.0215)
Above limit -0.602*** -0.615***
(0.0423) (0.0217)
Equity / debt (in 2007) 2.452***
(0.466)
Loans / assets (in 2007) 1.514***
(0.188)
Log of assets (in 2007) 0.828***
(0.0113)
Constant 0.540** 13.96*** 13.66*** 13.96***
(0.237) (0.0158) (0.0108) (0.0103)
Observations 1,794 1,794 1,794 1,794
R-squared 0.871 0.964 0.984 0.995
Bank FE NO YES YES YES
Bank-Range FE NO NO YES YES
Bank-Time FE NO NO NO YES
 Statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, 
respectively.
